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1. INTRODUCTION 
Watermarking was originally a technique to embed 
a visible figure within the structure of a sheet of paper. 
Such a watermark is formed by thinning the paper 
where the figure should appear. The mark would be 
hidden from view under typical viewing conditions but 
become visible when light is shone through the paper. 
Watermarks were used to authenticate paper currency 
and encode information about the publisher of a work, 
among other uses.
Digital watermarking seeks to perform an analogous 
function in digital media rather than in paper. It inseparably 
embeds a hidden, secondary signal (the watermark or 
mark) within a primary signal (the cover data or cover 
signal). The primary signal is often intended for human 
consumption (e.g. audio or image data). The secondary 
signal provides additional information about the primary 
signal. This additional information can be used for a 
wide variety of purposes: copy prevention, copyright 
protection, authentication, copy control, device control, 
etc. Watermarks differ from headers and other out-of-
band data channels by virtue of their being embedded 
within the primary signal itself.
Watermarking has become increasingly important 
in securing intellectual property rights. By embedding 
copyright information within the work itself rather than in 
headers that can be easily lost in format conversions or 
malicious attack, digital watermarking holds out the hope 
that theft can be discovered and minimised. Furthermore, 
watermarking provides an additional layer of security 
beyond conventional cryptographic protections. Once a 
work has been decrypted, for example, cryptographic 
methods no longer protect it. An attacker is free to 
use the content at will. If the work were watermarked, 
however, it may be possible to prevent unauthorised use 
or track down the attacker.
Some uses of digital watermarking require no security 
because there is no incentive to disrupt the watermark. 
Most uses, on the other hand, require security against 
active attacks of various kinds. Much research has gone 
into creating digital watermark systems which are secure 
against malicious attack.
Securing digital watermarks has proven inherently 
difficult for a wide variety of reasons. Many uses (e.g. 
protecting digital video in consumer devices from illicit 
copying) require watermarks and watermark detectors to 
be in the control of potential adversaries (any consumer 
could be an attacker) for an indefinite period. This 
gives the attacker time to examine the function of the 
detector and manipulate the watermarked data. Even 
tamper resistant hardware can provide only a little added 
security if an attacker has a practically unlimited supply 
of fresh copies of the hardware as can be expected in 
the case of consumer electronics where attackers, such as 
organised crime, have the financial incentive and means 
to carry out the attack. Securing watermarks against all 
the various possible attacks under these conditions is 
difficult1.
This paper provides a brief introduction to watermarking 
techniques, various categories of attacks, and a sample 
of known attacks.
2. BACKGROUND 
Watermarking systems are composed of, at the 
most fundamental level, a watermark embedder (which 
attempts to incorporate the watermark into the cover 
signal) and a watermark detector (which attempts to 
detect a watermark in a received signal). At the core of 
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each is a watermark encoder and decoder respectively. 
The encoder translates the input signal into a watermark 
signal. In the case of an image watermarking system, 
for example, the input signal which will be embedded 
may be translated into a pixel array which is scaled 
to fit the dimensions of the cover image. The input 
could then be added in the spatial domain to the cover 
data, pixel for pixel. The encoding and embedding may 
take place in the cover data’s native domain or in a 
transformation domain (e.g. FFT, wavelet, DCT, etc.)2.
The decoder then attempts to find the watermark in the 
signal it receives and reconstruct the message originally 
sent to the embedder.
Watermarking systems are further categorised by the 
information used by the embedder and detector. Figure 1 
depicts a watermarking system with an informed detector, 
the original cover data is available to the detector and 
is subtracted from its input signal. The residual signal 
is then decoded to determine if a watermark is present. 
If so, the contents of its message is decoded. The 
availability of the cover data greatly simplifies the job 
of the detector, but this also limits the application of 
this technology. It could be used to prove ownership of 
disputed intellectual property, for example, where the 
owner can be expected to provide the secret key and 
the cover data. Informed detection would be useless in 
consumer electronics where it would be infeasible to 
hold the original of every watermarked work in case it 
is ever needed for comparison.
The embedder and detector usually also receive 
a secret key which changes the way the watermark 
is embedded in the cover data. In the case of image 
watermarking, a system may use a standard reference 
pixel array to encode a particular message. A copy 
protection system may have, for example, one reference 
watermark to encode copying permitted and another 
to encode copying forbidden. If these reference marks 
were publicly known—which is often the case with 
standardised watermarking schemes—then it would be 
trivial to remove or mask the watermark if the reference 
marks were used as-is. Instead, secret keys change how 
the reference mark is embedded. This is analogous to 
how spread spectrum communication uses keys to resist 
jamming. Since the same key is used at the embedder 
and detector, this is also analogous to symmetric key 
cryptography.
Between the embedder and detector, the watermarked 
signal is transmitted over a noisy channel. This noise can 
represent any distortion, random electromagnetic noise, 
quantisation, compression, attenuation, malicious tampering, 
etc. Robust watermarking systems must be designed 
to function in spite of the noise that it can expect to 
encounter in its intended application. Robustness measures 
the likelihood that a watermark will be detectable and 
decodable after it has passed through a noisy channel.
To make watermarking feasible in applications where 
the detector can’t expect the cover data to be available, 
blind detection as depicted in Fig. 2 must be developed. 
A blind detector must attempt to detect a watermark based 
solely on the standard reference marks, the secret key, 
and the signal it receives. It does not have the cover 
data available. This is a considerably more complex 
problem than informed detection. Blind detection is 
usually accomplished by correlating the input signal to 
the reference mark as modified by the secret key.
There are three basic methods of correlation used 
in watermarking systems: linear correlation, normalised 
correlation, and correlation using a coefficient3. Other 
Figure 1. Watermarking system with Informed Detector.
Figure 2. Watermarking system with Blind Detector.
DEF. SCI. J., VOL. 61, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER 2011
410
is to the cover data. There are various metrics of fidelity 
ranging from simple calculations like the mean squared 
error to more sophisticated models of human perception 
as informed by experimental observations.
The effectiveness of an embedder/detector pair is 
measured as the likelihood that a detector will correctly 
detect and decode an embedded watermark immediately 
after the embedder stage, i.e. without any distortion before 
the detector stage. A system may not be 100 per cent 
effective by this measurement. Imperceptibility competes 
against the ideals of robustness and effectiveness. In 
general, the more effective and robust a watermark is, 
the more perceptible it is. A balance must be struck.
Embedding strength is another possible embedder 
input parameter which scales the mark to be embedded 
to make the system 100 per cent effective (in the ideal 
case) while keeping the watermark imperceptible. If the 
embedding strength is too high, the fidelity to the original 
cover data is damaged; if it is too low, the detector may 
fail to detect and decode the mark. In simple systems, this 
parameter can be preset, possibly based on experimental 
data, but this will result in some perceptible watermarks 
and some undetectable watermarks.
One strategy to improve the flexibility of the 
embedding strength parameter is to have a detector 
within the embedder. The detector offers feedback about 
detectability of the mark so the embedder can iteratively 
adjust the strength parameter for a particular cover work 
until the watermark is detectable. 
Another strategy is to give the watermark encoder 
the cover data as another input as shown in Fig. 3. The 
encoder uses the characteristics of the input to adjust 
the embedding strength. In the frequency domain for 
example, an encoder may embed more information in 
high frequencies where the changes are less perceptible. 
Even better results can be achieved by incorporating 
more sophisticated models of human perception. This 
allows the embedder to fine tune the balance between 
perceptibility and robustness. 
3. TypeS OF ATTACKS 
It can be difficult to categorise attacks in order 
to study them more effectively. For example, one 
categorisation of attacks gives a list of what it considers 
four inherently different attacking concepts: removal, 
correlation metrics have been proposed but most are 
equivalent to these three.
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The first metric, linear correlation, is the simplest. 
It is defined in Eqn. (1) where c is a vector representing 
the input signal, w is a vector representing the reference 
watermark to be tested for, and n is the number of 
vector elements in c. This produces a scalar value 
which is roughly proportional to how likely it is that 
the watermark is present. A watermarking system which 
employs linear correlation would compare this value 
to a threshold value. If the correlation metric is above 
the threshold, the detector assumes that w is present 
and proceeds to decode it. Otherwise, w is assumed to 
be absent. An appropriate threshold value is chosen to 
balance the likelihood of false positives against that of 
false negatives, depending on the application based on 
experimental results.
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Linear correlation is vulnerable to changes in the 
amplitude of c. This might happen if the contrast of an 
image is adjusted or if a signal is attenuated in transit. 
Normalising c and w to unit amplitude before correlating 
them as in Eqn. (2) can help overcome this vulnerability. 
This metric is normalised correlation.
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Normalised correlation is still vulnerable to changes 
in the DC component of c such as a change in brightness 
in a watermarked image. This can also be overcome by 
subtracting the mean of each vector before computing 
the normalised correlation. This metric is called the 
correlation coefficient, defined in Eqn. 3.
One design goal of watermarking systems is 
imperceptibility. Since the cover data is primarily meant 
for human consumption, the watermark should not unduly 
interfere with that purpose. In some applications, such 
as medical imaging, imperceptibility of the distortion 
created by embedding a watermark is critical. Fidelity 
measures how perceptually similar a watermarked signal 
Figure 3. Watermarking system with informed embedder.
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geometrical, cryptographic, and protocol4. Removal attacks 
aim at removing a watermark. geometrical attacks seek 
to make the watermark undetectable by distorting the 
cover data. The distinction between these two types of 
attacks seems superfluous. Both have the effect of making 
the watermark undetectable. Cryptographic attacks are 
ambiguously defined by their similarity to attacks against 
cryptographic systems. Finally, protocol attacks are said 
to attack the concept of the watermarking application. It 
is unclear what this is intended to mean. It seems to be a 
catch-all category since they place their own novel attack 
(i.e. copying a watermark from one work to another) 
within this category. Overall, this is an unsatisfying 
categorisation. Better categorisations can be obtained by 
asking simple questions about the attacker. 
3.1 What Does the Attacker Know? 
Another useful way to categorise a potential attack 
is by what information the attacker knows which can 
help in carrying out an attack.
Perhaps the most optimistic is the assumption that 
the attacker knows nothing specific about a particular 
watermarking system. The attacker may have a work that 
may or may not be watermarked. This assumption also 
requires that all users of the watermarking system can 
be perfectly trusted to never become an attacker and to 
never make a mistake in preserving the confidentiality of 
the system. The attacker may know about watermarking 
and its weaknesses in general. A system that relies on 
these assumptions is only minimally secure.
It seems reasonable to assume that the attacker can gain 
access to a known watermarked work, perhaps the work 
that is under attack. This allows the attacker to perform 
a rudimentary level of analysis. If an attacker has more 
than one known watermarked work, a collusion attack 
(which will be discussed later) becomes possible.
knowing the watermarking algorithm can also help 
an attacker. It is safest to assume that an attacker can 
learn the algorithm2. In fact, the cryptographic community 
virtually always shares the details of cryptographic 
algorithms. This allows a wide audience to attempt to 
find weaknesses and perhaps improve the algorithms. 
The digital watermarking community follows suit. The 
assumption that an attacker knows a watermarking algorithm 
is also why secret keys are used. If the security of the 
system relies on the secrecy of the algorithm, then if 
that secrecy is ever breached, an entirely new system 
must be created. On the other hand, if the security of 
a system relies on the secrecy of a key alone, then a 
breach of key security is confined to data watermarked 
with that key.
Having a detector can also aid an attacker. Various 
attacks become possible when an attacker can slightly 
modify a watermarked work and can repeatedly consult the 
detector to see if the watermark has been removed. These 
oracle attacks can be quite effective even in the absence 
of knowledge of how the algorithm works. This level of 
access must be assumed in any consumer device. 
3.2 What Does the Attacker Want? 
There are three broad goals that attackers of watermarking 
systems may have: unauthorised detection, unauthorised 
embedding, and unauthorised removal. A fourth goal, 
unauthorised modification, is actually a combination of 
removal and embedding. Beyond this, an attacker may 
attempt to exploit a weakness in the way a watermarking 
system is deployed.
Detection may be a protected action in some watermarking 
applications. If a business charges its customers for the 
service of detecting unauthorised use of their intellectual 
property by embedding special watermarks prior to its 
distribution, for example, the business needs to prevent its 
competitors and customers from detecting the watermarks. 
The company wants to be the sole provider of detection. 
Detection can be further broken down into three discrete, 
progressively powerful actions: detection of the presence of 
a watermark, distinguishing one watermark from another, 
and decoding the message of the watermark.
Unauthorised embedding can frustrate systems that 
seek to authenticate the ownership of the cover data. 
Aside from encoding and embedding a new message, an 
adversary may also try to copy a legitimate watermark 
from one cover work to another4.
Unauthorised removal is probably the most typical 
form of attack against watermarking systems. This attack 
may more properly thought of as rendering the watermark 
undetectable. It is not necessary to actually restore the 
original cover data to a near pristine state. All that is 
truly required is that the watermark is undetectable 
and that the cover data is still in an usable state. For 
example, one rudimentary form of watermarking is to 
replace the least significant bits (LSB) of the cover 
data with the message to be transmitted. Changes in the 
LSB are generally imperceptible. An attacker aiming to 
remove the watermark would not need to restore the 
LSB (probably impossible without side information); the 
attacker would only need to randomise the LSB or replace 
them with a constant value. Such an attack would make 
the watermark undetectable yet preserve the usefulness 
of the distorted watermarked cover data. 
A further distinction within removal attacks is drawn.
Masking attacks merely make the watermark undetectable 
to a given detector. For example, if a detector is incapable 
of detecting an image that has been flipped around the 
vertical axis, doing so masks the watermark for that 
detector. A slightly more sophisticated detector may also 
check the flipped image to prevent this attack. For this 
detector, the watermark has been preserved and remains 
detectable. In contrast, elimination attacks truly remove 
a watermark to the point that no detector no matter how 
sophisticated will be able to detect it. 
4. exAmpleS
Digital watermark technology has elicited many 
creative attacks. Only a few of the many attacks which 
have been published are included here. Others can be 
found in literature5.
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4.1 Distortions 
The goal of a watermark removal attack is to change 
watermarked data in such a way that it is still usable (e.g. 
looks or sounds good to a human being) but frustrates 
the watermarking system. A wide variety of distortions 
may fall within this category.
Most watermarking systems rely on synchronised data. 
The detection of a watermark relies on the correlation 
of the data to be tested with a reference mark as altered 
by a secret key. Any distortion that interferes with this 
correlation can cause the watermarking detector to fail. 
For example, shifting an image by one pixel, an audio 
track by one sample, or a video by one frame may be 
enough to foil a watermark detector. To counter this simple 
attack, a detector may do a search for the watermark 
within close proximity to the expected location or attempt 
detection after a number of common transformations. 
One drawback to this approach is that each additional 
test increases the likelihood of a false positive, i.e. the 
detector reporting a watermark where there is none. This 
must be taken into account when designing the system, 
usually by increasing the detection threshold.
There are many examples of simple, rather ordinary 
geometrical distortions that can fool a detector. In the 
case of two dimensional images, these distortions include 
cropping, small rotations, skewing, small aspect ratio 
changes, and so on. StirMark is a research tool originally 
created to simulate the distortion created by scanning 
a printed image6.
StirMark basically simulates a resampling process, 
i.e. it introduces the same kind of errors into an image 
that you would expect if you printed an image on a 
high-quality printer and then scan the image again with 
a high-quality scanner. The algorithm applies a minor 
geometric distortion, i.e., the image is slightly stretched, 
sheared, shifted, and/or rotated by an unnoticeable random 
amount and then resampled using Nyquist ... interpolation. 
In addition, a transfer function that introduces a small 
and smoothly distributed error into all sample values is 
applied, which acts like a small non-linear analog/digital 
converter imperfection typically found in scanners and 
display devices. 
StirMark proved surprisingly effective against 
contemporary watermarking systems7. It has been used 
extensively in watermarking literature as a benchmark 
for robustness. StirMark continues to be an important 
benchmark in watermarking research due to the difficulty 
of designing watermarking systems which are robust 
against even simple geometrical distortions. 
Another form of distortion attack is signal processing 
such as noise removal. Watermarking systems often add 
information to the high frequencies of a work because 
the alteration is less perceptible there. This creates a 
vulnerability that can be exploited to remove the watermark. 
Passing the watermarked data through a low-pass filter 
may be sufficient to remove the watermark. 
4.2 mosaic Attack 
A mosaic attack segments the watermarked work into 
smaller slices that are too small to carry the watermark8.
These slices are then presented in a unified way that 
makes it look like a single work. For example, an image 
can be split into smaller images and assembled on a web 
page to appear as one image. Many image watermarking 
systems work on blocks of pixels rather than on the 
whole image at once, so these slices would need to be 
smaller than the block size for this attack to work.
In general, a successful removal attack may be carried 
out by scrambling the watermarked cover data prior to 
the detector and descrambling it after the detector has 
failed to detect the watermark. The mosaic attack is a 
specific case of the scrambling/descrambling attack. It 
can be imagined that an attacker could manufacture and 
sell a hardware scrambler that would intercept a media 
signal prior to a detector chip and a hardware descrambler 
that would reassemble the media signal prior to output 
to a human being. 
4.3 Collusion Attack 
A collusion attack involves gathering more than one 
instance of watermarked works in order to gain added 
information about the watermark itself. A collusion attack 
tan take two forms: either using several different works 
marked with the same watermark, or using several copies 
of the same work marked with different watermarks.
If several works can be gathered that have been marked 
with the same watermark (e.g. using a photographer’s 
portfolio which has been watermarked with copyright 
information), these works can be averaged together. 
If some portion of the watermark is invariant across 
these works, the averaged result will correlate highly 
with the watermark. Each additional image will bring 
the watermark data into sharper focus. An attacker can 
use this averaged data as an approximate watermark to 
remove the watermark, or even to embed the watermark 
in other works. This removal is targeted and impacts the 
quality of the watermarked data in a mild way, coming 
relatively close to the original cover data.
The second form of the collusion attack requires the 
attacker to gather several of the same work marked with 
different watermarks. This may arise, for example, in copy 
control systems whose aim is to track authorised copies. 
In these systems, if an authorised copy is leaked to the 
public or to other unauthorised parties, the individualised 
watermark can be used to determine which authorised copy 
was leaked. If several authorised copies can be gathered 
together and averaged, the individual watermarks should 
be averaged out leaving an approximation of the original. 
If there is an invariant portion of the watermark, detection 
of the watermark may still be possible, but individualised 
information will be difficult to extract thereby frustrating 
a portion of the purpose of the watermark. It is possible 
to design systems that resist this attack9.
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4.4 Ambiguity Attack 
An ambiguity attack does not remove a watermark. 
Instead, it casts doubt on the ownership of a watermarked 
work11. Watermarks are sometimes used to lay claim to 
a distributed work. An intellectual property owner can 
embed a watermark into a work and thereafter distribute it. 
If a question of ownership arises, the owner can provide 
their secret key to a third party (e.g. a court of law) to 
demonstrate that the work bears their watermark. The 
ambiguity attack makes the work appear to bear more 
than one watermark: the true watermark and one in the 
possession of the attacker.
In an informed detection system, this attack is as 
simple as creating a fake watermark and subtracting it from 
the distributed work in order to form a false original. If 
the true mark and the false mark are uncorrelated, then 
the true original will be correlated to the fake watermark 
and therefore also appear to be watermarked with the 
false mark. The owner and the attacker have seemingly 
equal claims on the work.
In blind detection systems, the attacker must find a 
false mark that is highly correlated with the distributed 
work. Since this false mark is very probably orthogonal 
to the true mark, its correlation to the watermarked work 
is due to the characteristics of the original work. Again, 
both the watermarked work and the original will appear 
to be watermarked with the false mark. 
There has been some efforts to create non-invertible 
watermarking schemes which make it infeasible to find 
a second watermark for a given work10. This can be 
accomplished by using a cryptographic signature of the 
work as an input to the embedder alongside the secret 
key. This is simple to implement in an informed detector 
where the original is available to recompute the signature. 
A standard cryptographic hash function is sufficient 
to create the signature. This is not so simple in blind 
detectors. The signature must still be computable after 
any distortion or attack has altered the image. This is 
non-trivial. 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis Attack 
If an attacker has unlimited access to a detector 
(which is often the case in consumer electronics), then 
it becomes possible to mount a sensitivity analysis 
attack, a rather sophisticated attack. There are three 
stages to such an attack. The first stage is to find a 
distorted version of the watermarked work which lies 
close to the detection region. This can be accomplished 
by incrementally altering the watermarked work until the 
detector no longer detects the watermark. This process 
need not guarantee that the distorted work will be usable 
as-is. Its role is solely to determine a point on or near 
the boundary of the detection region. The second step 
is to determine the normal to the boundary. This can be 
done by iteratively adding random vectors of increasing 
magnitude to the distorted work until the detector reports 
a watermark. With enough such vectors, an estimation 
of the normal can be made. The final step is to subtract 
a scaled version of the normal from the watermarked 
work. The scaling of the normal can be adjusted until 
it is barely outside the detection region. Through this 
process, an unwatermarked work can be found that is as 
close as possible in vector space to the watermarked work. 
Assumed is that proximity in vector space is strongly 
related to being perceptually proximate, and that the 
detection region has a uniform normal vector.
One approach to making this attack less computationally 
feasible is to provide a random result if the detection 
metric falls within a range of the threshold. This increases 
the number of trials necessary to locate the boundary of 
the detection region, to find its normal, and to find a 
distorted version of the watermarked work that is reliably 
reported by the detector as unwatermarked. This approach 
does not eliminate the possibility of a sensitivity analysis 
attack, but it can make such an attack more costly. The 
drawback is that it necessarily increases the number of 
false positives and negatives.
Another approach is to alter the shape of the 
detection region boundary in such a way that it has 
many normals. 
4.6 Gradient Descent Attack 
Beyond a simple detector, if an attacker has not a 
detector that reports the value of the detection metric, 
it is possible to perform a gradient descent attack. The 
idea is similar to a sensitivity analysis attack in that it 
attempts to find the watermarked work closest to the 
watermarked work in vector space. It is possible using 
the detection metric to determine a gradient. It is assumed 
that descending the gradient from the watermarked work 
is the shortest path out of the detection region. 
4.7 Histogram Attack 
A fixed depth image watermarking system (i.e. all 
elements of the watermark vector have the same absolute 
value) is vulnerable to the histogram attack is introduced11.
Images with many distinct peaks in their histogram are 
especially vulnerable to this attack (e.g. images which 
have had their colour values reduced to only a subset of 
the full range of values possible). When a fixed depth 
watermark is applied to an image, it will transform single 
peaks into two separate peaks. From this information, the 
attacker is able to say that the pixels in the peak in the 
value closer to zero probably correspond to watermark 
pixels with the negative value while the pixels in the 
other peak probably correspond to watermark pixels with 
the positive value. The confidence of this estimate can 
be increased with each additional watermarked image 
which the attacker has access to. The attacker does not 
need a detector to mount this attack. 
4.8 Copy Attack 
The final type of attack covered here is the copy 
attack12. It is saved for last because the first step is to 
perform a watermark removal attack such as several 
covered earlier that approximates the original cover 
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data. Once an approximate original has been obtained, 
the difference to the watermarked work can be taken. 
This difference approximates the value of the watermark. 
This can be added to another work in an attempt to 
watermark it, an unauthorised embedding.
One potential counter is to tie a watermark to a 
given work so that it can’t be used elsewhere. This can 
be accomplished, for example, by using a signature of the 
work in computing the mark. This signature must not be 
altered by the inclusion of the watermark. Otherwise, the 
detector would be unable to compute the same signature 
as the embedder. 
5. CONClUSIONS 
Securing watermarks is an inherently difficult design 
problem. The security of a mark is constrained by the 
data in which it is embedded and by the perceptual 
acuity of human observers. Many applications require that 
potential attackers have unlimited access to watermarked 
data and detectors. If even a single attacker is successful, 
the ease of perfectly copying digital data ensures that 
this single failure can benefit all potential attackers1.
Watermarks may catch the unwary attacker or present 
an inconvenience to a determined attacker, but it cannot 
presently stand on its own as a security measure. The 
field is still relatively young and may be able to produce 
secure watermarking systems in the future, but the cards 
are stacked against the technology. 
ReFeReNCeS 
1. Arnold, M.; Schmucker, M. & Wolthusen, S.D. 
Techniques and applications of digital watermarking 
and content protection. Boston: Artech House, 2003, 
9 p. 
2. Cayre, F.; Fontaine, C. & Furon, T. Watermarking 
security: Theory and practice. IEEE Trans. Signal 
Proce., 2005, 53(10) pt II, 3976-987. 
3. Cox, I.; Miller, M. & Bloom, J. Digital watermarking. 
San Francisco: Morgan kaufmann Publishers, 2002, 
pp. 75-82. 
4. kutter, M.; Voloshynovskiy, S. & Herrigel, A. The 
watermark copy attack. In Proceedings of the SPIE, 
2000, 3971, 371-80. 
5. Cox, I. & Linnartz, J. Some general methods for 
tampering with watermarks, IEEE J. Selected Areas 
Comm., 1998, 16(4), 587-93. 
6. kuhn, M. StirMark – Image-watermarking robustness 
test. 10 November 1997. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/
stirmark.html. [Accessed: 26 October 2008]. 
7. Petitcolas, F.; Anderson, R. & kuhn, M. Attacks 
on copyright marking systems. In Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science, edited by David Aucsmith, 
Portland, Oregon, USA, 14-17 April, 1998, 1525, 
pp. 218-238.
8. Petitcolas, F.; Anderson, R. & kuhn, M. Information 
hiding: A survey. In Proceedings of the IEEE, 1999, 
87(7),1062-078. 
9. He, S. & Wu, M. Improving collusion resistance of 
error correcting code based multimedia fingerprinting. 
In IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, 
Speech, and Signal Proceedings. 2005. 2, pp. ii/1029-
ii/1032. 
10. Craver, S.; Memon, N.; yeo, B. & yeung, M. Resolving 
rightful ownerships with invisible watermarking 
techniques: Limitations, attacks, and implications. 
IEEE J. Selected Areas Comm., 1998, 16(4), 573-
86. 
11. Maes, M. Twin peaks: The histogram attack on fixed 
depth image watermarks. In Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Workshop on Information Hiding, 1998, 
pp. 290-305.
12. kutter, M.; Voloshynovskiy, S. & Herrigel, A. The 
watermark copy attack. In Proceedings of the SPIE, 
2000, 3971, 371-80.
Contributors
mr Jonathan Blake received the BSc 
(Computer Engg.) from the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas in 2003 where 
he is currently a graduate student in the 
Electrical Engineering program and also 
works in the Department of Institutional 
Analysis and Planning as a Data Warehouse 
Developer.
Dr Shahram latifi received the MSc (Electrical Engg.) from 
Fanni, Teheran University, Iran in 1980. He received the MSc 
and PhD (Electrical and Computer Engg.) from Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, in 1986 and 1989, respectively. He is 
currently a Professor of Electrical Engineering at the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research areas includes: Image 
processing, biosurveillance, biometrics, document analysis, 
computer networks, fault tolerant computing, parallel processing, 
and data compression. 
